The 5.5 Hole

It's interesting how one arrives at a story idea.  I read a an article about the Padres and their plans for 2012.  The article had very little to do with the size of Petco Park.  It had very little to do with the general feel from most fans and players that the walls need to be brought in.  Yet, that's exactly what I pulled from the article.  I was charged up and ready to defend the so-called "pitcher's parks" in baseball.  But as I began my research (which started with park factor stats), I discovered something far more interesting.  The league leader in park factor for both runs and home runs has been on a steady increase since 2008 after and steady decrease from 2001-2008.  (Note: there was a slight drop in the leader for park factor related to home runs in 2011)

Park factor simply compares the rate of a specified stat at home for teams vs. the rate on the road.  A park factor of 1 is average.  Anything less than 1 is below average and anything over 1 is above average.  For example, 1.25 would be 25% higher than the average.  For the math nerds, ESPN has a calculation for you: ((homeRS + homeRA)/(homeG)) / ((roadRS + roadRA)/(roadG)).

Below is a chart of the park factor leaders in runs from 2001-2011:



And the park factor leaders for home runs from 2001-2011:



As you can see, the two charts have a similar slope.  Downward from 2001-2008, and upward after:







Why was there such a shift in park factor leaders starting in 2009?

There have been four new ballparks opened since the start of the 2008 season; The New Yankee Stadium (2009), Citi Field (2009), Nationals Park (2008), and Target Field (2010).  Now we can easily say that Yankee Stadium is conducive to offense.  The first year of existence saw a record number of home runs hit.  It has been in the top four for park factor home runs since it opened.  In 2011, Yankee Stadium ranked 6th in park factor for runs.  In 2010, it ranked second.  Nationals park has hovered around average for both runs and home runs since it opened.  Both Citi Field and Target Field are thought to lean more towards the pitcher-friendly side of the fence.

Even if the new ballparks caused an overall shift, the shift would only apply to the average.  These numbers in the charts above reflect the league leader each year.  In 2008, the last year of the decline in park factor for runs, the Rangers led the league.  In 2009 and 2010, the Rockies led the league in park factor for runs as we started to see the park factor climb.  In 2011, the Rangers again led.  For home runs, the park factor leader stayed the same in 2008 and 2009.  The Yankees led both of those years.  Then, as the park factor leader's numbers began to climb, the White Sox led the league in 2010, followed by the Rangers in 2011.

This tells me more about the make-up of these teams rather than the parks themselves.  There have not been enough drastic changes to the ballparks to cause the upward slope we see in the park factor leader boards.  To me, it seems the clubs with offense-friendly ballparks have begun doing a better job of putting together teams that can exploit those parks.  Once a front office has determined what type of players fit a ballpark best, the team should and usually does play that park to a distinct home field advantage. 

From 2001-2008 teams had less separation and the leaders in park factor runs and home runs were getting closer and closer to average.  However, as teams adjusted and attempted to build clubs that reflect the ballpark better, the successful ones opened the gap. 

Most off-seasons are headlined by free agency.  This one is no exception.  The difference this season lies with the managers.  There are three vacancies at the helm of some high-profile clubs.  Unlike other managerial hunts for teams like the Nationals, Marlins, A's, and Astros, this hunt features some of the most coveted positions in baseball.

The Chicago Cubs, The St. Louis Cardinals, and the Boston Red Sox are all looking for new managers.  The Cubs just fired Mike Quade today.  Tony LaRussa announced his retirement Monday.  Terry Francona left Boston shortly after the Red Sox implosion at the end of September.  Three big name ball clubs are now searching for replacements.

The Cubs and Theo Epstein announced their next manager would need to have prior coaching or managerial experience on the big-league level.  Whether this will be the case when the new manager is ultimately hired remains to be seen.  People say things all the time, then change their minds.  However, limiting the search to people with Major League experience is the right move for Chicago.  The emotional, fan-driven reaction would be to hire Ryne Sandberg.  Sandberg is a fan favorite and is currently managing in Triple-A, but he is wrong for Chicago with Theo Epstein as the team President and Jed Hoyer as the GM.  Theo Epstein knows what type of manager he wants.  Jed Hoyer knows what type of manager can get the best out of the talent currently available.  Theo worked with Terry Francona, and together they saw unparalleled success in Boston.  Jed Hoyer watched Bud Black lead the Padres, with no real contributors outside Adrian Gonzalez, to 90 wins in 2010.  He followed that up to a decent 2011 considering this team didn't even have Adrian Gonzalez.  The Cubs don't need a rookie at the big-league level leading the club.  They need someone with experience who can coexist with Epstein's and Hoyer's player-evaluation methods, out-of-the-box thinking, and potential meddling.  Sandberg is not that person. 

Sandberg may, however, be the person to take over St. Louis.  Reports started popping up today that the Cardinals had asked the Phillies (the host club of the Minor League affiliate Sandberg manages) if they could interview Sandberg.  Perhaps these reports were designed to drive Cubs' fans crazy after they heard Epstein all but shoot down the idea of Sandberg ever coming to Chicago.  Perhaps they are legitimate.  Either way, Sandberg is a better fit in St. Louis.  The club is already built for success, even without Pujols.  In fact, should Sandberg take of and Pujols sign elsewhere, Sandberg would have a built in safety net for expectations of the 2012 season.  If they don't succeed, 'Hey, Sandberg is new and he didn't even have Pujols.'  If they do succeed, 'Hey, this Sandberg guy can even win without Pujols.'  Obviously the dynamic changes a bit if Pujols returns, but Sandberg would be a good fit in St. Louis regardless. 

The Red Sox remain the mystery.  All three of these clubs have been linked to the same available names and faces.  Yet, the Red Sox have not even hinted what direction they may go.  Filling Francona's shoes will be difficult.  He won two World Series, made the play-offs five times, and was a well-liked manager in Boston.  Whoever takes over will have his work cut out for him.  The Red Sox are dealing with drama from all angles.  They will have to rebuild from more than just a personnel standpoint.  Clubhouse cohesiveness will need to be addressed.  This may not be the most desirable job out there.

Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder may dominate the off-season headlines, but filling managerial openings with these three clubs could be bigger news.  The Cubs are on a quest to overwrite history and win a World Series.  The Cardinals are looking to turn the page.  And the Red Sox are just trying to recover.  One of the more interesting off-seasons in recent memory is ahead of us following one of the more interesting postseasons. 

Baseball is good. 

A few weeks ago I wrote about my desire to find an objective way to evaluate managers. There has to be a better way than simply looking at wins and losses. I have neither the skill nor resources to work with advanced algorithms necessary for some of the managerial computer models. These simulations help rate managers just fine, but are well outside my realm of comprehension. What I'd like to do is rate a manager objectively by assigning point totals for success in specific categories and docking points for failures in other categories. The first category we'll explore is postseason wins.

Tony LaRussa is, perhaps, the best manager of his generation, maybe one of the best all-time. But I'll let every other site you read shower him with praise and thank him for 30+ years of baseball service. In this article he will simply be used as a tool in our experiment for rating managers. LaRussa has had his fair share of postseason success, so he makes a perfect example.

Tony LaRussa won 68 postseason games out of 123 postseason games managed. That equates to a postseason winning percentage of .553. For the sake of our evaluation we need the numbers expressed as ratios in order to keep our final managerial rating as a ratio expression. Doesn't a manager rating of .597 sound so much better than a rating of 1,457? Those are arbitrary numbers obviously, but I think the ratio is easier on the eyes.

Unfortunately even this statistic is skewed over the short-term. A manager with only one trip to the post season may have a record of 0-3 or 1-3 or 2-3 if knocked out in the division series. Therefore, the other evaluation categories will become increasingly important, and one may have to discredit certain stats based on a limited sample size.

Going forward, we will look at other categories to use in our manager evaluation with the eventual end goal of being able to rate any manager out there.