The 5.5 Hole

It's interesting how one arrives at a story idea.  I read a an article about the Padres and their plans for 2012.  The article had very little to do with the size of Petco Park.  It had very little to do with the general feel from most fans and players that the walls need to be brought in.  Yet, that's exactly what I pulled from the article.  I was charged up and ready to defend the so-called "pitcher's parks" in baseball.  But as I began my research (which started with park factor stats), I discovered something far more interesting.  The league leader in park factor for both runs and home runs has been on a steady increase since 2008 after and steady decrease from 2001-2008.  (Note: there was a slight drop in the leader for park factor related to home runs in 2011)

Park factor simply compares the rate of a specified stat at home for teams vs. the rate on the road.  A park factor of 1 is average.  Anything less than 1 is below average and anything over 1 is above average.  For example, 1.25 would be 25% higher than the average.  For the math nerds, ESPN has a calculation for you: ((homeRS + homeRA)/(homeG)) / ((roadRS + roadRA)/(roadG)).

Below is a chart of the park factor leaders in runs from 2001-2011:



And the park factor leaders for home runs from 2001-2011:



As you can see, the two charts have a similar slope.  Downward from 2001-2008, and upward after:







Why was there such a shift in park factor leaders starting in 2009?

There have been four new ballparks opened since the start of the 2008 season; The New Yankee Stadium (2009), Citi Field (2009), Nationals Park (2008), and Target Field (2010).  Now we can easily say that Yankee Stadium is conducive to offense.  The first year of existence saw a record number of home runs hit.  It has been in the top four for park factor home runs since it opened.  In 2011, Yankee Stadium ranked 6th in park factor for runs.  In 2010, it ranked second.  Nationals park has hovered around average for both runs and home runs since it opened.  Both Citi Field and Target Field are thought to lean more towards the pitcher-friendly side of the fence.

Even if the new ballparks caused an overall shift, the shift would only apply to the average.  These numbers in the charts above reflect the league leader each year.  In 2008, the last year of the decline in park factor for runs, the Rangers led the league.  In 2009 and 2010, the Rockies led the league in park factor for runs as we started to see the park factor climb.  In 2011, the Rangers again led.  For home runs, the park factor leader stayed the same in 2008 and 2009.  The Yankees led both of those years.  Then, as the park factor leader's numbers began to climb, the White Sox led the league in 2010, followed by the Rangers in 2011.

This tells me more about the make-up of these teams rather than the parks themselves.  There have not been enough drastic changes to the ballparks to cause the upward slope we see in the park factor leader boards.  To me, it seems the clubs with offense-friendly ballparks have begun doing a better job of putting together teams that can exploit those parks.  Once a front office has determined what type of players fit a ballpark best, the team should and usually does play that park to a distinct home field advantage. 

From 2001-2008 teams had less separation and the leaders in park factor runs and home runs were getting closer and closer to average.  However, as teams adjusted and attempted to build clubs that reflect the ballpark better, the successful ones opened the gap. 

Jake Peavy was nothing more than a southern boy who could throw hard. The Padres drafted him in the 15th round of the amateur draft and sent him to play rookie ball. They didn't know what they had at the time. They only hoped they knew.

Peavy quickly dominated the rookie league in Arizona and Idaho posting a combined 9-1 record, 1.17 ERA, 103 strikeouts, and only 24 walks. All this was in 84.2 innings pitched at the ripe old age of 18. He continued his success in class-A ball in 2000. He pitched 132.2 innings, struck out 164, and had a 3.09:1 strikeout to walk ratio. He was well on his way to proving he may have been worth a bit more than a 15th round pick.

2001 saw Peavy's promotion to both high-A ball and double-A ball. Between the two leagues he went 9-6, had a 2.97 ERA, and a ridiculous 188 strikeouts in 133.1 innings pitched. That happened to be Peavy's last full year of Minor League baseball.

2002 and 2003 were adjustment years for Peavy as he pitched for the Padres in the "show." He had ERA's of 4.52 and 4.11 respectively. Then 2004 happened. Jake Peavy turned himself into an ace. Peavy went 15-6 with a 2.27 ERA, capturing the ERA title for that year. He struck out 173 batters and posted his first above 4 WAR at 4.5. The following year Peavy led the Padres to a division crown and led the league in strike outs. However, injuries that would soon plague his career began to slow him down. He broke a rib celebrating the division title, then during the off-season nagging injuries led to mechanical adjustments. But he still managed to finish with 215 strikeouts in 2006.

In 2007, Peavy finally garnered the national attention that had been paid to him for years by those in San Diego. He won the pitcher's triple-crown by leading the league in wins (19), ERA (2.54), and strikeouts (240). He was the unanimous Cy Young award winner for 2007 and looked to be well on his way to a career of total domination. Peavy tried to stave off a trade from the cash-strapped Padres, but even with a strained tendon from running bases, he was eventually dealt to the White Sox in July of 2009.

Strained ankle and all, Peavy became a member of the Chicago White Sox. He finished the 2009 season strong, going 3-0 with a 1.35 ERA for the White Sox. But Peavy's injury struggles would follow him into the 2010 season. In July of 2010, Peavy suffered a detached muscle in his upper back, an injury never before seen in Major League Baseball. No one was quite sure if or when Peavy would return. But he did. He struggled through another injury-plagued season this year, but finished strong.

Jake Peavy's start last night, in which he went 6.1 innings striking out nine and giving up no runs, is expected to be his last of the season. He will be given the entire off-season to get healthy and hopefully return to 100%.

Whether Peavy can do so remains up in the air. He has only started 30 or more games in a season three times in his career. He's seen more than his fair share of injuries. Yet, at only 30, he'll be 31 mid-way through next year, Peavy still has time. He's never completely lost the ability to strike people out. Peavy's swinging strike rate for his career is 11.2%. It dropped off in 2009 to 8.3%, but showed signs of recovery this year with a rate if 9.2%.

An off-season of rest, focus, and training will hopefully bring Jake Peavy back. This may very well be his last chance to regain the stuff that made him so nasty. This may be his last chance to regain the form that saw him rack up the second highest K/9 ratio and the second lowest ERA in baseball between 2004-2007.

Equity is the fuel that powers players and managers.  Equity buys time.  For players, managers, even General Managers, equity keeps contracts alive and forgives shortcomings.  Success, however brief or fleeting, can build that equity.  Carlos Zambrano had it.  A.J. Burnett had it.  Now, when the equity has been burnt up, Zambrano is standing on the side of the road waiving an empty fuel can.  Burnett is coasting in the slow lane, just hoping to make it to his exit.  And Ozzie Guillen is running on fumes.

In an ESPNChicago article, Ozzie Guillen talked about his desire for a contract extension this off-season.  Personal feelings aside, I don't deny the fact that Guillen has been one of the better White Sox managers.  Not great, but better than average.  I don't even dispute the fact that Guillen has a right to want an extension before going into the final year of his contract.  However, the Chicago White Sox are in a pennant race, or at least the closest thing to a pennant race the A.L. Central has to offer.  His focus should be elsewhere.

Jim Riggleman was building a team from the ground up and succeeding with Washington.  He was not in the middle of a pennant race.  He was also not coming to the end of a multi-year contract.  Unlike Guillen's threat to walk out on his team next season if he does not get a new contract, Riggleman had justification.  In September of 2007, Guillen's contract was extended through the 2012 season.  Earlier than that, he had a contract extension in 2005 that was to carry him through 2009.  Guillen hasn't had job security issues in the past.  He has never operated as a "lame-duck manager" as he put it in the ESPNChicago article.  And the timing of Guillen's comments make the situation worse than it should have been.

Ozzie Guillen guided the Chicago White Sox to a World Championship in 2005.  He guided the team to another play-off berth in 2008.  Since then, he's been running on equity.  He may have even been running on equity since the 2005 season considering the White Sox were bounced in the first round of the 2008 play-offs.  Yet, the equity from a World Series title can only last so long.  Especially in a city like Chicago.  Two play-off appearances in eight years is great for a small market club.  It's good for a mid-market club.  It's pretty bad for a big market club like the White Sox. 

It seems as if Ozzie Guillen has built a larger than life image of himself in his head.  He has not won multiple World Series titles.  He has not been a perennial play-off team.  Removing 2005 and 2008 from the equation, Guillen has gone 479-463.  That's only a .508 winning percentage.  Hardly the type of numbers justifying mid-season contract talks and threats.  His volatile temper, his relationship with General Manager Kenny Williams, and his comments to media have burned through his the fuel of his equity faster than a eight-mile-per-gallon Hummer H2. 

Guillen will probably get his contract extension.  He will probably be the White Sox manager for years to come.  But much of this depends on his ability to build more equity.  Demanding a new contract with 29 games left to go in a season where you have had to fight and scrap to remain above .500 does not go a long ways toward remaining with the club.  Guillen will probably realize this and back off a bit.  If not, he could be in trouble.

Owners and General Managers don't usually like it when you pour fuel out the window while already running on fumes.